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This  paper  addresses  key  implications  in  momentous  current  global  energy  choices  – both  for  social  sci-
ence  and  for society.  Energy  can  be over-used  as  a  lens  for viewing  social  processes.  But it is nonetheless  of
profound  importance.  Understanding  possible  ‘sustainable  energy’  transformations  requires  attention  to
many tricky  issues  in social  theory:  around  agency  and  structure  and  the  interplay  of  power,  contingency
and  practice.  These  factors  are  as  much  shaping  of the  knowledges  and  normativities  supposedly  driving
transformation,  as they  are  shaped  by them.  So, ideas  and  hopes  about  possible  pathways  for  change  –
as  well  as  notions  of ‘the  transition’  itself – can  be  deeply  constituted  by incumbent  interests.  The  paper
addresses  these  dynamics  by considering  contending  forms  of  transformation  centring  on renewable
energy,  nuclear  power  and  climate  geoengineering.  Several  challenges  are  identiﬁed  for  social  science.
These  apply  especially  where  there  are  aims  to help  enable  more  democratic  exercise  of social  agency.enewable energy
uclear power
limate geoengineering
ustainability
eﬂexive governance
ociotechnical regimes
lanetary boundaries
They  enjoin  responsibilities  to ‘open  up’  (rather  than  ‘close  down’),  active  political  spaces  for  critical  con-
tention  over  alternative  pathways.  If  due  attention  is to be  given  to marginalised  interests,  then  a  reﬂexive
view  must  be  taken of transformation.  The  paper  ends  with a series  of concrete  political  lessons.
© 2014  The  Author.  Published  by Elsevier  Ltd.  This  is an  open  access  article  under  the  CC  BY  license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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The advent of this journal is propitious. And this is not just
or the relatively small community of researchers engaged specif-
cally in social scientiﬁc study of energy systems. There has long
een recognition for the role of social research in energy stud-
es [1] and there can be little doubt of its importance [2]. But
he reverse is also true. Of the many expediently segregated –
ut intimately interconnected [3,4] – functional ‘sectors’ of socio-
conomic life (like water, food and shelter), there is also a sense
n which none are more signiﬁcant to general development of
ocial science at large – or indeed society itself – than is ‘energy’
5–7].
It is the ‘energy sector’, after all, that currently stands most
omentously at a historic “crossroads” [8]: wrangling over a
rospective globally concerted transformation away from fos-
il carbon infrastructures [9,10]. This is not just an intractable
echnical undertaking [11]. It is also a monumental cultural and
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arate imaginations of the world and of the place of humanity
ithin this [13,14]. The subjective perspectives under which these
ssues are analysed and understood, can be as important as the
bjective developments themselves [15]. However viewed, though,
 conjunction of extraordinary pressures is brieﬂy opening a rare
window of opportunity’ [16], through which the re-structuring of
arge-scale, long-lived ‘sociotechnical regimes’ may  be unusually
ensitive equally to human agency and historical contingency [17].
So, contemporary developments speciﬁcally bearing on the
nergy sector, may  in complex, nonlinear ways help yield poten-
ially profound importance for the more general constituting of
uture global societies [18]. And understandings of these social
ynamics and their possible consequences and drivers depend
n – and carry under-appreciated implications for – some of the
ost fundamental themes in social science as a whole [15,19].
hese include: relations between agency and structure; the
haping of knowledges and normativities and the interplay of
ower, contingency and practice [20]. Here, as elsewhere, it may
e that the most rigorously formative inﬂuences on academic
ctivity and the quality of the results, might not be the ‘internal’
rocedures of institutionalised disciplines, but the ‘external’
der the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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ransdisciplinary challenges of sincere efforts to effect real-world
hange [21,22].
At the outset, then, this raises demanding questions over what
n this context might be meant by ‘power’. One way  or another,
t is through various kinds of power dynamics, that any social
ransformation comes to be realised or suppressed [23]. But power
s a notoriously slippery concept, which deserves to be clariﬁed
ight from the start. In colloquial terms, power is about the
xercise of some form of social control [24]. But ‘control’ is barely
ess enigmatic [24,25] – also introducing immediate queries over
he constituting and bounding of chains of causes, consequences,
ntentions and collateral effects [26]. In what sense might long
un energy futures meaningfully be considered a category even
usceptible to ‘control’ [27,28]? If so, where does the buck stop in
racing drivers and implications [29]? Under what notions of inten-
ionality [30]? And who is the ‘we’ doing the controlling [31:186]?
fter all, when has humanity as a whole even undertaken – let
lone controlled, still less achieved – any single explicitly and
ollectively deliberate end at all?
Even in relatively straightforward organisational settings, sim-
le deterministic pictures of control can be problematic. And
hey are often better understood more as instrumental ﬁctions
ecessary for the assertion of privilege, than as disinterested
ccounts of actuality [32–36]. When stripped of this expedi-
ncy, many real-world instances of ‘control’ can decompose into
omplex conditions of diverse mutually adapting intentionalities
nd (in)tractabilities. And the possibilities of many alternative
ccountings for causality among proliferating multitudes of nested
mplicated factors, leaves any particular tracing of control sig-
iﬁcantly in the eye of the beholder [37]. In energy futures as
lsewhere, then, care must be taken that analysis of social dynam-
cs does not – under instrumental pressure of patronage to “see like
 state” [38] – simply entrench and perpetuate misleading ‘fallacies
f control’ [39]. Such reinforcing of incumbency can all-too-easily
ead to the opposite of transformation.
This is at least as true in wider governance, as it is within organi-
ations [35,40]. And, crucially, it applies as much when contemplat-
ng the exercise of democratic, as of autocratic, power in ‘social con-
rol’ [28]. In other words, even in the constituting of the concepts
hemselves, incumbency has a habit of subverting understandings
f ‘power’ and ‘control’ [41,42]. History provides many examples
here ostensibly revolutionary efforts to overturn incumbency
imply reproduce it in another form – often more entrenched
43–45]. If it is to help effect real socio-political change of the
epth and scale envisaged, then, serious consideration of the social
ynamics of energy transformation, should not fall into this trap.
In order to address these difﬁculties, then, ‘power’ might better
e addressed in a more nuanced and qualiﬁed guise: as ‘asymmetri-
ally structured agency’. Here, ‘agency’ refers to the many different
inds of capacity involved in shaping and performing (rather than
ontrolling) social action [24]. Such asymmetries are constituted by
iverse distributions in many social modes [46], media [47], levels
48], relations [49,50], ﬁelds [51] and forms of capability [52]. In
ll these senses, though, agency (and so power) can be recognised
s inherently more dynamic, relational and distributed, than it is
peciﬁcally located [53]. And there are recursively co-constituting
 i.e.: “reﬂexive” [54] – relations with intentionality [55], discourse
56], normativity [57] and political and economic interests [58]. It
s these that make so problematic, any simple notion of deliberately
ontrolled social transformation.
So, this understanding of power as asymmetries in ﬂows of
ocial agency has important practical implications for global energy
ransformation. And these are as salient to understandings, inten-
ions and discourse about change, as to the effecting of change itself.
he implicated forms of agency are not singular and controlling,
c
t
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ut complex and multidimensional; reﬂexively conditioning the
upposedly driving knowledges and motivations [59]. And the
requently knotty contours in these eddying ﬂows of agency [60],
ean that incumbency encounters many ways to subvert the con-
tituting of change. So, ostensibly novel ‘transitions’ may  readily
nd up concealing what are in actuality, deeper realignments
ith existing structures. In other words, the realised forms of
transformation’ may  be more discursive and superﬁcial than
aterial and substantive. The more radical and challenging the
ttempted transformation, the greater this propensity to subver-
ion [61]. Concrete examples (discussed further below), include
ays in which pressures for ‘sustainable’ energy transformation
riven primarily by interest in renewable energy, might yield
nstead, transitions to nuclear power or climate geoengineering.
eeking to effect social transformation is a Faustian dance. Power
s necessary for transformation, but this may  be subverted if power
tself is not transformed.
These are thorny challenges – familiar in colloquial discussion,
ut curiously neglected in analysis. The present paper can grap-
le only with a few. Some of the more profound issues will be
eturned to at the end. For now, discussion will pick up in a more
rosaic way. First, it will set the stage for discussing currently
ooted energy transformations, by reviewing the intimate general
elationships between ‘energy systems’ and wider social orders.
hen, it will turn to some of the entrenched structurings of Moder-
ity – as a particular social form – and the crucial place within
his of energy technologies (especially nuclear power). From here,
ttention will focus on a crucial way in which incumbent interests
mpede transformation in this sector – constraining and condi-
ioning what counts as ‘reliable knowledge’ about possible energy
athways. This yields some concrete ﬁndings concerning the con-
uct of social science in relation to energy policy.
These ﬁndings will in turn lead to an array of important wider
mplications for general relations between science and democracy
s means to help effect substantive (rather than rhetorical) trans-
ormation. The penultimate section will return to the dilemmas and
ontradictions of power and control sketched above – and urge a
ore reﬂexive approach to their reconciliation. In the end, it will be
rgued that real transformation in global energy institutions and
nfrastructures – like any radical social change more generally –
equires transformation in the ‘knowing and doing’ of power itself.
lthough quite general in their scope, these conclusions underpin
 very speciﬁc set of practical political recommendations of direct
elevance to the social science of energy.
. Energy and society
In contemplating the magnitude of the current struggles for
lobal energy transformations, it is important to recall – with other
apers in this issue [62–65] – that earlier realised cultural, infras-
ructural, political and economic transformations have also been
rofound [66]. And easily forgotten, is that secular rates of change
ave also frequently been formidable [67,68]. Cumulative infra-
tructure developments are often as formative in their effects as
holesale substitution [69]. But few previous structural shifts have
een as historically rapid or socially pervasive as those now envis-
ged for global energy transitions [70]. Nor – crucially – have they
spired to the same depth or extent of explicitly shared social
ntentionality or assertively coordinated political control. It is in
he associated discursive pressures to emphasise the need for (and
laim and appropriate) such control, that there arise the dangers of
he instrumental fallacies discussed above.
Challenges of global energy transformations, then, are not just
n a signiﬁcantly greater scale, but also arguably of a radically
 & Soc
d
u
t
o
i
p
t
m
i
a
t
t
e
w
a
e
b
t
a
i
r
t
t
n
s
l
a
p
p
i
i
w
g
[
k
o
s
[
l
a
c
o
c
p
a
c
i
t
l
w
o
a
o
u
‘
p
s
m
f
m
w
t
f
s
t
i
w
o
p
a
p
m
[
e
e
t
p
m
o
a
e
o
[
a
e
t
3
n
i
s
d
w
t
m
r
[
f
i
t
e
p
M
‘
s
a
v
u
t
t
t
c
o
e
c
t
eA. Stirling / Energy Research
ifferent order to any previous deliberately concerted political
ndertaking. It is worth reﬂecting on the empowering audacity of
his ontological novelty, before wringing hands too despairingly
ver the oppressive difﬁculties bearing on current efforts to achieve
t. In the absence of deliberate reﬂection on this point, it is not just
olitical rhetoric, but the fabric of knowledge and expectations
hemselves, that can become vulnerable to expediency and
anipulation. For instance, many forms of anti-transformative
nertia and self-interest in incumbent energy regimes [71], are
lready impacting in deep and strong ways on understandings of
wo radically contrasting forms of prospective global ‘transforma-
ion’ – respectively ‘progressive’ and ‘conservative’ with respect to
ntrenched regime interests.
The ‘progressive’ transformation (reviewed further below)
ould harness diverse proven viable global renewable resources
nd innovations to deliver energy services at the same time as
liminating carbon emissions and realising other Sustainability
eneﬁts [70,72–78]. The alternative ‘conservative’ transforma-
ion, by contrast, would use an array of speculative technologies
nd unprecedented global institutions aimed solely at assum-
ng human ‘control’ over the planetary climate [79–82]. Although
equiring economic and political investment on a scale similar
o that required for direct transformation of energy infrastruc-
ures, most forms of climate geoengineering would leave energy
eeds entirely unaddressed [83,84]. Yet, it is this manifestly more
peculative alternative, that is gaining strikingly increasing high-
evel worldwide attention [85]. That a conservative transition built
round climate geoengineering is thought in some quarters to
resent a somehow more tractable governance challenge to a
rogressive transformation based on renewable energy [86,87],
s an indication of the strength of entrenched vested interests
n this sector. Their asserted agencies are not just restricted
ithin a particular regime, but also leave an imprint on more
eneral patterns of policy knowledge and political expectation
88,89]. The result is an especially pertinent example of the
ind of expedient fallacy of control described at the beginning
f this paper [39]. There seems here a particular role for social
cience in facilitating more reasoned reﬂection on these issues
90,91].
These are the kinds of issue that arise in contemplating the
ong run relationships between energy systems and global societies
t large. There is, however, a need for critical caution. Hyperbolic
laims concerning energy and society are nothing new. Discussions
f energy futures seem especially prone to misleading simpliﬁ-
ation and intellectual hubris [92]. So it is worth asking before
roceeding, whether ‘energy’ really is so distinctively important
s a lens through which to engage with wider social dynamics? Of
ourse – as mentioned above – the material signiﬁcance of energy
n society is longstanding [93] . . . and long recognised [94,95]. But
his is also true of other essential material functions in human
ife – for instance, around water, food and shelter [96]. Yet as
ell as being profoundly interlinked [97], the social speciﬁcities
f energy-related ﬂows and structures in the contemporary world
re arguably even more formative and foundational than in these
ther ‘sectors’.
Energy dynamics feature especially prominently in many
nderstandings of past processes of structural emergence [98] and
collapse’ [99]. And it is contemporary systems for global energy
rovision, that are arguably most implicated at the grandest of
cales in “fuelling capitalism” [100], as well as in the most inti-
ate details of everyday lives [101,102]. The particular culturalormativities of energy are thus distinguished not just in the sheer
agnitude and imperative necessity of its diverse roles, but in the
ays in which patterns and practices in production and consump-
ion implicate social agency and structure in distinctively speciﬁc
u
n
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orms. So, it is perhaps in relation most to practises around energy
ervices that a proverbial time-travelling Pleistocene human ances-
or might arguably experience their most bewildering surprises
n the everyday materialities of social life across much of the
orld.
Be this as it may, great care must still be taken over many kinds
f ‘energy exceptionalism’. It is clear that disciplinary fashions and
rivileges can help drive overly promiscuous recourse to energy
s a source of metaphor and metonym in social science. Energy
roductivity is implicated in some of the most inﬂexible deter-
inisms and disabling simpliﬁcations of historical materialism
53,103–105]. Energy is arguably disproportionately prominent
qually in theories about cultural evolution [106–108], political
cology [109,110] and social action [111]. And with respect to his-
orical dynamics and social orders in general, few themes are more
roliﬁcally invoked than energy, as grounds for reductive deter-
inism or essentialist reiﬁcation [112]. Especially in the language
f entropy, ambitious efforts at energy-based social explanations
re widespread in anthropology [113,114], archaeology [115–117],
conomics [118–123], agronomics [124], industrial and social ecol-
gy [125–128], sociology [129], management [130–132], politics
133–135], the arts [136], history [137] and futurology [138]. If
nything, the problem is more that explanatory potentials for
nergy-based concepts in social understandings are overstated,
han that they are neglected.
. Modernity and technology
But there exist more particular reasons for attention to the
exus between energy research & social science. These rest more
n addressing discursive, cultural and political attributes of energy
ystems, than their general physical parameters. They arise in a
ifferent aspect of the current historical juncture of energy choices
ith which this paper began. For, it is also in the energy arena
hat narratives of Modernity have played out what is arguably their
ost formative dynamics [139]. Half a century ago, the worldwide
ise of nuclear power provided a leitmotif for post-war Modernity
140,141]. But more recent drastic relative decline in global nuclear
ortunes offer an equally iconic disruption of this story [142]. There
s of course much complex detail in many divergent settings. But
he bottom line is pretty clear. In order to appreciate this, it is nec-
ssary to take a few steps back and consider the historical bigger
icture.
Technology in general is central to contested notions of
odernity over the past century and a half [139]. In a stylised
Enlightenment’ account [143], technological progress is presented
imply as an emergent outcome of incumbent social structures
nd dynamics. Whatever innovations are produced under pre-
ailing patterns of power and privilege, come to be recognised
ncritically as ‘progress’ [144]. Ignoring the manifest roles of con-
ingency, path dependency and channelling by power [145–152],
echnical advance therefore tends to be deﬁned in speciﬁc ‘sectors’,
autologously and teleologically by reference to those particular
onﬁgurations that happen to arise.
Ironically, the hegemonic persistence of this ‘Whig’ [153] ‘myth
f progress’ [154,155], is due in large part to the depth of its own
rror. So irrevocably and ubiquitously have successive sociotechni-
al regimes typically become entrenched (in areas like agriculture,
ransport, communications, manufacturing and war  – as well as
nergy), that it is difﬁcult to imagine any plausible counterfactual
nder which large scale trajectories might have oriented in alter-
ative directions [156]. So, the potent singularity of this ‘one-track’
race-to-the-future’ ‘Enlightenment’ imagination, is itself arguably
ne of the prime forces in this entrenchment [157]. In other words,
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he magnitude of the fallacy exerts a self-reinforcing effect. It is
gainst this background, that it can be seen that the history of
uclear power presents a starkly disruptive picture, moving from
arly success as a synonym of Modernity [140], to later failure as a
otentially destabilising antonym.
Right from the outset, nuclear power has been more than just
ne sectoral instance of a supposed ‘race to the future’, pursued by
eans of a single narrowly privileged technological trajectory. For a
ong time, nuclear technology was in many ways emblematic of this
eneral syndrome [139]. Realisations of wartime military ambi-
ions for nuclear technologies were formatively horriﬁc [158,159].
hese engendered intense guilt-driven idealistic counter-reactions
n inﬂuential quarters of many scientiﬁc communities – around
eating ‘swords into ploughshares’ for ‘atoms for peace’ [160].
ut the incentives also intensiﬁed, to establish infrastructures
or nuclear weapons and military propulsion [161–163]. These
stensibly contending cultural forces then in turn interacted syn-
rgistically to help nurture a vigorous early elite ‘nuclear discourse’
n many countries, in which nuclear prowess became intensely
ssociated with national identity [141,140].
This potent cultural brew in turn reinforced exuberant expec-
ations and massive institutional and material investment in civil
uclear power during the 1950s and 1960s. And it was  this that, in
any contexts, led nuclear power quickly to consolidate its status
s the most canonical exemplar of Modernity [140]. More mate-
ial path-dependent increasing returns also set in, to help channel
ery speciﬁc technological trajectories based around design tra-
itions initially optimised for submarine propulsion or plutonium
roduction [164]. Each was (and remains) equally poorly suited
o maximising goals of safe or economic civilian power pro-
uction [165]. It is signiﬁcant that these manifestly sub-optimal
eactor designs should persist and become so effectively irre-
ersible within global nuclear supply chains. This is especially so,
iven that decision making processes in this sector were claimed
and widely viewed), as the epitome of synoptic rationality [166].
hat nuclear power was  backed in this period by such enor-
ous economic, political and cultural resources, should (on the
ace of it) have allowed more latitude for escaping such closure
167]. For such ‘lock-in’ nonetheless to take place, then, sim-
ly shows the importance of contingency and power – even in
he most deliberate and concerted of policy programmes. This
lone is a highly relevant lesson for contemporary challenges
round climate change – where the burgeoning proﬁle of climate
eoengineering raises (as mentioned above) potentially similar
ynamics.
Also of current topical relevance for climate change debates,
s that it was this same continuing general hegemonic proﬁle,
hat helped attract to nuclear power from the later 1960s, some
qually iconic reactions on the part of ostensibly ‘anti-modernist’
 or reﬂexively modern [168] – global social movements around
nvironment, peace and social justice [169]. As a result, from the
970s, the formidable discursive, institutional and infrastructural
tabilities hitherto accumulating around nuclear technology, suf-
ered a remarkable international destabilisation. Early processes
f increasing returns were countered by even greater negative
eedbacks, as defensive regulatory responses to political opposi-
ion revealed and exacerbated previously concealed diseconomies
170].
These negative effects were then further ampliﬁed by a suc-
ession of nuclear accidents – of kinds previously ofﬁcially denied
ven as realistic prospects [171]. Together with the increasingly
anifest intractabilities of nuclear waste management [172], theseorces were reinforced in the 80s by a growing intolerance for
oncealed uncompetitiveness, fostered by a new political econ-
my  of liberalisation [17]. In short, over the space of just three
b
cial Science 1 (2014) 83–95
ecades, the early ballistic ascendancy of nuclear power went into
qually meteoric reverse. Arguably in no other area of the his-
ory of technology, is there a conjunction of such apparently rapid
nd revolutionary global emergence, followed so quickly by poten-
ially equally transformative decline [173,174]. Discomﬁted by the
isfortunes of this prodigal offspring, it seems in the energy ‘sec-
or’ that the deﬁning “one-track race” of Modernity ﬁrst tripped up
143,175].
. Power and knowledge
In seeking to understand these mutually profound implica-
ions between developments in the energy ﬁeld and issues of
ider salience in social science, it is worth considering the spe-
iﬁc dynamics around nuclear energy in a little more depth and
etail. Of particular relevance, is that they illustrate the crucial
oles played by incumbent patterns of power and privilege, not
nly in constituting social, economic and technical ‘regimes’ as
bjects of scrutiny, but also in conﬁguring the subjective social pro-
esses through which these regimes are more widely scrutinised
nd understood [176]. And this is a lesson not lost on those for
hom inﬂuence and stakes are highest – or who enjoy most privi-
eged access to the means of this shaping. Few of these means are
ore powerfully self-fulﬁlling, than the ways incumbent interests
onﬁgure ‘scientiﬁc’ knowledges such as to condition wider social
xpectations over what is ‘realistic’ or ‘unrealistic’ as directions for
echnological change [177]. The overall, effect can be a powerful
ircular reinforcement of incumbency.
The momentous energy choices with which this chapter
egan, offer a particularly good example of this. With climate
hange now widely held to present an over-riding imperative,
egemonic patterns of knowledge in other areas are being sys-
ematically reconﬁgured [178]–perhaps most notably with regard
o nuclear power. Problems of radioactive waste management,
uclear weapons persistence and proliferation, chronic uncompet-
tiveness and periodic catastrophic accidents all remain obstinately
nresolved [179]. Of course, optimistic claims remain. Perhaps they
ay  yet be borne out [180]. But the persistence of these chal-
enges – each dating back to the origins of nuclear power – is
rrefutable [181]. Either way, whether by deliberate agency or more
istributed realignment, it seems that the orthogonal advent of
idespread general concerns over climate change is in many ways
nd quarters re-conditioning much more speciﬁc ‘scientiﬁc’ under-
tandings of technical nuclear issues. Whatever the balance of
trategy and contingency, it is clear that tactical narratives around
 prospective global “nuclear renaissance” are signiﬁcantly rein-
orced [180,182].
The most conspicuous impact of these dynamics, lies in high
evel policy debates over current energy choices. Indeed, the fact
f this being a ‘choice’ at all is often exactly the point at issue.
lthough the challenges of a ‘zero carbon’ energy transition are
ndoubtedly ambitious and daunting, it is clear that there exists
 diversity of possible pathways through which to address them
183]. The obstacles to an entirely renewable global energy sys-
em are not – as often claimed [184–186] – about intrinsic limits
n resources, technologies or economics [17,187–195]. Repeated
etailed assessments show that the energy service needs of a more
eavily populated and equitable world enjoying radically higher
evels of wellbeing, can be cost-effectively met  (in dynamic terms
196,197]) entirely and solely through diverse currently availableiomass, hydro, ocean and geothermal power [70,72–78].
Though much room remains for argument over details, there
an be little doubt that transformations in global energy services
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ased entirely around renewables are at least realistic in the sense
hat these trajectories are in principle technically practicable, eco-
omically feasible, socially viable – and so potentially historically
ealisable. Indeed, it is precisely the anticipation of this prospect
hat helps underpin the current ambitious commitment by the
orld’s arguably most successful industrial economy, Germany, to
ndertake the possibly globally catalytic ‘Energiewende’  [198–201].
Of course, the mere possibility of a wholesale global move to
enewable energy does not mean that such a transition is there-
ore automatically to be supported – still less that it will occur. As
ith other essentially political ends in plural societies, it is equally
ossible legitimately to propound (or contest) either a renewable
r nuclear-based global energy vision. Under contrasting values
nd perspectives, either might be considered normatively desirable
 or on balance preferable. And – despite some intrinsic incom-
atibilities – there also exist many different kinds of diverse mix
202]. But what is clear, is that the overall industrial, infrastruc-
ural and operational implications of broadly contrasting visions
or nuclear and renewable-based zero carbon energy infrastruc-
ures are so disparate, that real-world energy systems cannot be
ptimised simultaneously around both pathways [203]. Despite
he latitude for diversity, then, there emerges signiﬁcant scope for
ocial – and therefore political – choice.
This is where there arises a remarkable further indication of
he effects of power on knowledge. For it remains the case that
n many energy policy debates (notably outside Germany), the
act of this choice is frequently not only side-lined in the ‘evi-
ence base’ constituted by high-level policy documentation, it is
ometimes effectively excluded. Around the world, ofﬁcial studies
ersistently present the achieving of a low carbon energy future
ot as a matter of social choice across divergent options, values,
nterests and preferences, but as a far more constrained and tech-
ical matter. In the UK, for instance, a historic ﬁxation with nuclear
ower is especially entrenched, exerting unusually heavy inﬂu-
nce over central government policy [204]. This is surprising, since
he scale of nuclear generation in the UK remains relatively small
ompared to Germany (both in relative and absolute terms) – and
he nuclear supply chain is far less developed or successful on the
nternational stage [179,205]. The UK renewable resource is also
ore favourable [76,201]. Yet it is in the UK that nuclear inter-
sts seem to have exerted some of the most constraining effects
n national energy policy. That so much more progress towards an
lternative transformation should be made in a country where the
uccess of the national nuclear industry might have been expected
o make this vested interest so relatively strong, seems a signif-
cant indication of the comparative quality of post-War German
emocracy.
Be this as it may, it is informative to consider a little empirical
etail here. In a rapid succession of detailed UK Government anal-
ses conducted between 2002 and 2006, two early White Papers
nprecedentedly highlighted the feasibility and viability of strate-
ies based around renewables and energy efﬁciency [206,207].
uclear power itself was speciﬁcally identiﬁed as “unattractive”
207:12;44;61). But the leadership of the then UK Labour Gov-
rnment reacted by rejecting their own commissioned analysis,
uickly convening instead a third, more superﬁcial, ‘review’ in
rder to reinstate the nuclear option [208]. When this was itself
ater overturned by a judicial review on grounds of various proce-
ural inadequacies [209], the Prime Minister remarked that any
uch further appraisal “won’t affect the policy at all” [210]. The
isjuncture between the material actualities of choice and the
olitical construct of closure, could hardly be more stark. It is
n these ways, that assertively pronounced expectations by pow-
rful actors (within, as outside, government), may  aspire to be
elf-fulﬁlling.
p
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Also revealing are the positions over this period of the most rel-
vant senior ofﬁcials. For instance, UK Government Chief Scientist
rofessor Sir David King repeatedly asserted throughout, an exclu-
ive and unqualiﬁed position summarised (in a title for one of his
igh proﬁle newspaper commentaries): “we have no alternative to
uclear power: if there were other sources of low carbon energy I would
e in favour, but there aren’t”  [211]. On occasions when directly
onfronted with evidence that, though he may not personally prefer
hem, viable alternatives do manifestly exist, King would quickly
etreat to an argument that nuclear is still essential simply because
we need to do everything” [212]. And when this somewhat non-
peciﬁc defence was  further challenged, to the effect that a range
f diverse mixes might (if so chosen), also readily entirely omit the
uclear option [183], the partisanship became even more evident
 in a transparently teleological “we need to keep the nuclear option
pen” [213].
Again, this manifestly circular argument graphically illuminates
he way in which authoritatively asserted ‘scientiﬁc’ knowledges
an have the effect of asymmetrically emphasising particular
avoured pathways at the expense of others. It conﬁrms that the
bstacles to transformative change are manifestly more institu-
ional and cultural (and epistemic and normative), than they are
aterial or technical [214]. And this realisation in turn further
ighlights the depth of the wider social transformations that are
ntailed [11]. It also underscores that these are as much about
ransformations of knowledges and imaginations about society,
s they are about modiﬁcations to the material world. For social
cience and political action alike, then, energy transformation
resents an especially crucial challenge.
. Analysis and action
These are some key aspects of the momentous conditions
eferred to at the beginning, attending the emergence of this jour-
al. And it is on this basis that it can be argued that the signiﬁcance
f these debates extends beyond the relevance of social science for
nergy studies, to encompass the important ramiﬁcations of energy
olitics for social science at large. So what do these implications
ntail most concretely? It would be impossible fully to do justice to
his topic in a single article. Many themes are touched on in accom-
anying papers in the present issue [215–220]. In further editions
f this journal, a diversity of wider repercussions will doubtless
nfold. For the moment, the present paper will conclude by sur-
eying a few of the more clear among the immediate challenges
ighlighted for social research.
First, the underqualiﬁed expressions of energy expertise
eported in the above UK case, raise a general issue around ‘speak-
ng truth to power’. This is particularly acute for policy appraisal
n the energy sector, because this ﬁeld has been especially impor-
ant in the development and application of prescriptive methods
n quantitative social science [221,222]. And the resulting bodies of
nowledge have in turn been particularly inﬂuential in encourag-
ng widespread conceptualisations of politics in general as a process
f ‘rational choice’ [223]. Such thinking has most recently come to
rominence in the worldwide spread of rhetorics around ‘new pub-
ic management’ [224,225] and ‘evidence based policy’ [226,227].
et across the underlying disciplines of neoclassical economics,
perations research and decision analysis, shared foundational the-
ry concerning exactly this kind of formal expert ‘rationality’ in
ocial choice, has actually earned Nobel Prizes by showing through
ainstaking logical deduction, that its own  underpinning axioms
re signiﬁcantly in tension [228–230].
In other words, it follows from precepts of rigour in ‘rational
nalysis’ itself, that there can in a plural society, be no guarantee of
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ny singular deﬁnitively prescriptive ‘sound scientiﬁc’ ‘evidence-
ased’, ‘rational choice’ of the kind so prominent in the rhetoric of
any current energy policy debates. The point is not just that this
s difﬁcult to achieve. The notion itself of a uniquely ‘science based’
ecision, is actually an oxymoron. So, the resulting implications
re profoundly important for a host of social science methodolo-
ies that are very widely practised in policy appraisal in the energy
ector. Risk assessment, cost beneﬁt analysis, life cycle assessment,
ulti-criteria appraisal and decision theory, are all seriously com-
romised by their own deepest understandings of their intrinsic
olicy limitations [231,232]. The point is not that these methods
re somehow entirely without value. They can still provide useful
nformation – for instance, as a counterpoint to entirely unsubstan-
iated assertions like those excluding even reasonable possibility
f particular energy alternatives [233]. But this value lies more in
pening up appreciations of choice, than in closing these down
234]. When claims are made in energy debates (as elsewhere)
o a single exclusively deﬁnitive ‘evidence based’ decision, they
re (ironically and by exactly this claim) as plainly wrong as it is
ossible to be.
What emerges in turn from this, is that challenges of social
hoice like those with which this paper began, are inherently
atters for explicitly political – rather than purely analytical – res-
lution [52,235]. More speciﬁcally, countervailing claims that such
ifﬁcult questions can be fully resolved through calculative pro-
edures of reductive aggregation or analytical optimisation are not
erely difﬁcult to realise in practice [235,236]. They are fundamen-
ally meaningless even to aspire to – let alone claim. What is needed
nstead, where any political claims are to be made to democracy,
re general qualities like openness, participation and accountabil-
ty [237] – themselves typically made possible and sustained by
ctive wider political mobilisation and robust critical debate.
In ways that are neglected in policy discourse, this deals a
ore general blow to increasingly technocratic and scientistic
odels for expert decision making in the energy sector, viewing
ational choice as a matter purely of prescriptive analysis, without
lear roles within particular policy areas for wider democratic
nstitutions, inclusive practices or political discourse. A crucial
ole for social science in this area, then, is not merely to ﬁnd
ays to bolt itself on at the end of ‘multidisciplinary’ analysis in
rder to inform the most effective implementation of some prior
stensibly apolitically determined ‘evidence based’ energy policy.
 key contribution for all kinds of social science lies also in helping
o inform – and catalyse, provoke and mobilise – more vibrant
olitical debate over the particular questions framings, values and
nowledges under which alternative courses of action look most
easonable. As in more speciﬁc assessment methods discussed
bove, it is more in opening up room for such activity than in
losing down around particular asserted understandings and com-
itments, that there lies the real contribution of interdisciplinary
ocial science in general [234].
It is admirable – and ironic – that the rare degree of reﬂexivity
nvolved in arriving at ‘impossibility’ results in social choice the-
ry, should be achieved in a ﬁeld generally disparaged by other
ranches of social science for a lack of reﬂexivity [238]. It is
ven more ironic, that the disciplinary communities who  are most
nformed about these insights, should often remain so coy about
ore publicly acknowledging the policy implications [239,240].
his leaves the door unduly open to the use of ‘evidence based’,
sound science’ language as a cloak for much more partisan polit-
cal agendas like those documented above around nuclear power
r climate geoengineering. Either way, there is further important
essage here not only for social choice theory, but also for other
ranches of social science that have perhaps become complacent
ver their own claims to reﬂexivity. Qualitative, interpretive and
‘
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onstructivist social science (of a kind well established in the study
f ‘energy regimes’) may  also learn much about being prepared to
dmit more openly in policy debates, their own  inherent limitations
 and propensities for self-interested institutional suppressions of
mbiguity and conditionality [15].
. Sustainability and democracy
Beyond analytical procedures, however, roles for democracy
re also subverted in other broader ways in current energy and
limate policy discourse. General governance processes around
Sustainability transitions’, for instance, often display a degree
f collective amnesia over the active forms of counter-power
hat made such radical aspirations a possibility in the ﬁrst place
241]. Historically informed social science has an important role
o play, in reminding how ‘Sustainability’ in general only became
levated to the highest levels of global governance as a result
f protracted, radically challenging and overtly political strug-
les by subaltern social movements [169]. As well as pioneering
any now-crucial organisational, technological and wider cultural
nnovations [242,243], it was  these ‘counterculture’ interests that
aintained continual pressure for diverse but interlinked impera-
ives around enfranchisement, emancipation, equality, ecology and
onviolence [100,244].
Yet – in energy policy debates as around Sustainability more
enerally – it is increasingly seen as self-evidently desirable that
hese creatively agonistic, fragmented and unruly arenas for civil
ociety politics be structured into more consensual, integrated,
rderly agendas for carefully designed ‘sustainability governance’
245]. In a classic ‘radicals dilemma’ [246], ostensible rationales for
his, lie in ‘pragmatic’ concerns over how best to effect transfor-
ative social and political change [247,248]. Yet – as shown by
he early success of the Green movement (like sister movements
or emancipation of classes, ethnicities, slaves, workers, colonies,
omen, young people and diverse sexualities) – there is an irony
ere [249]. In all these areas, it is in their more distributed and dis-
rderly forms that subaltern social agencies typically affect their
ost formative inﬂuence [250,251].
In their more formally institutionalised forms, it is particu-
ar organisations and individuals within these movements that
ave often become susceptible to treating means as ends – pursu-
ng strategic visibility, organisational positioning and reputational
ppropriation as proxies for earlier and generally more ambitious
ims. Of course, this reﬂects the paradoxes of power and con-
rol outlined earlier (especially with regard to knowledge). So, the
radical’s dilemma’ looks correspondingly more weighted towards
o-option than challenge. Either way, it must at least be enter-
ained that the securing of credibility in incumbent structures, is as
uch about responsively ‘surﬁng’ ﬂows of asymmetric agency, as
bout proactively effecting more widely substantive transforma-
ive change.
This point is especially signiﬁcant, since – explicitly or implicitly
 much social science work around energy Sustainability has the
ffect of substituting rumbustious, holistic, explicitly normative,
utonomous engagements by marginal interests [252], with
ranquil, neatly segregated and formally orchestrated procedures
f “polycentric governance” [253] – for instance in ‘global assess-
ents’ with narrow topical remits driven primarily by experts
254]. Where wider civil society is involved at all, it is mostly
hrough engagement of ‘invited’ (usually elite) ‘stakeholders’
255]. And where social science contributions are seen primarilyconsensus processes’ or ‘deliberative verdicts’, there is a reﬂection
n qualitative form of the same spurious kinds of closure committed
n quantitative expert analysis reviewed above [234].
 & Soc
f
o
p
c
c
s
t
t
i
i
t
e
t
b
t
g
T
t
e
e
[
i
c
a
e
d
p
B
e
b
S
e
o
t
p
‘
b
p
r
o
d
D
m
r
t
e
o
f
p
p
(
c
u
t
p
r
t
a
p
p
d
s
t
c
o
t
c
l
c
f
u
o
i
d
c
[
‘
‘
t
d
s
d
b
t
r
[
7
s
b
i
c
d
i
o
“
r
d
S
t
m
g
u
n
o
e
a
e
t
t
u
‘
i
p
r
a
cA. Stirling / Energy Research
All the more important for being side-lined by these pressures
or closure, then, a crucial role for social science emerges in rig-
rously setting out how all these processes – like knowledge
roduction more generally – are inherently socially and politi-
ally situated. And this illumination of how incumbent interests
an come to dominate the formal codiﬁcation of policy knowledge,
erves a very concrete positive function. It shows how transforma-
ion in the energy sector – like elsewhere – requires knowledges
hat are produced demonstrably independently from incumbent
nterests. This ‘independence’ is shown to stand most ﬁrmly, not
n some romanticised single ‘objective’ position, but in multiple
riangulations and counterpoints in pluralities of alternative
qually valid interpretations, each with their associated consti-
uting conditions [256]. In addition to offering a more robust
asis for transformation, then, this ‘plural conditional’ approach
o knowledge, also arguably offers better general prospects for
enuine inﬂuence by excluded subaltern interests [257,258].
his kind of active ‘opening up’ of political space is dispropor-
ionately important as an active aim in social research in the
nergy sector as elsewhere – precisely because it is social sci-
nce that shows how ‘closing down’ so often takes care of itself
234].
But the established emphasis of social science in energy stud-
es lies rather far from this. Indeed, the patterns of instrumental
losure discussed above sometimes penetrate most deeply, in the
pparently most progressive of social research on ‘Sustainable
nergy transitions’ [15]. It is remarkable, for instance, given the
iversity of political drivers mentioned above, how often the com-
lex breadth of “Sustainability” – canonically highlighted by the
rundtland Commission around social equity, human and wider
cological integrity [259] – tends to contract to a single “low car-
on transition” alone [11,260–267]. This ‘political pyrolysis’ of
ustainability (a reduction simply to carbon), compresses the open-
nded, multiplicity of values and issues, into a single ostensibly
ne-dimensional technical metric [268]. And these processes of
echnocratic reduction are even further compounded where the
lurality of possible ‘transformations’ are further compressed into
the’ (supposedly singular) ‘transition’ – a closure further reinforced
y the assertive deﬁnite article [15]. There is little room here for
olitics, let alone democracy. And the role of social science risks
eduction to that of public relations [269,270].
This said, Sustainability in general, does in many wider areas
f international energy governance retain a greater diversity of
imensions. This is the case, for instance, around the ‘Millenium
evelopment Goals’ process [271,272]. But even this potentially
ore plural political space is itself subject to powerful cur-
ent reductions. Despite efforts to soften the compression to
echnical parameters alone [273,274], the recent prominent ‘plan-
tary boundaries’ initiative in ‘Sustainability governance’ accepts
nly material metrics to qualify as deﬁning the “operating space
or humanity” [275]. That this is a technical – rather than
olitical – domain, is emphasised by the strictly delimited sup-
osedly “non-negotiable” status of these “planetary boundaries”
276:31). Insistence on “absolutely no uncertainty“, brooking “no
ompromise” [277] reinforces the technocratic message, further
ndermining appreciation of the scope for wider ambiguities,
rade-offs and contending values. So, the space for social science,
olitics and democracy alike are all seriously reduced.
To be fair, however, complexity and indeterminacy do play
oles in this discourse. But, in a contradictory twist, the main ways
hese are expressed are as “catastrophic tipping points” [278]. By
sserting these with paradoxical conﬁdence not as indeterminate
ossibilities but as determinate “boundaries”, it is as if they are
recisely known [275,276]. Thus are complexity and uncertainty
omesticated under an elaborated discourse of control. And the
‘
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pace for politics is further conﬁned, by the impression that
hese ‘boundaries’ render the Earth itself static and brittle. The
rucial political point risks being lost: that it is particular kinds
f human societies that render disadvantaged people vulnerable;
hat this occurs even under the most favourable of environmental
onditions; and that the most likely dynamics of transformation
ie in hope-inspired alternative choices, not fear driven technical
onstraints.
Far from this, the ‘planetary boundaries’ discourse goes even
urther in homogenising human agency and responsibility. The
ndifferentiated singularity of humanity in the central concept
f ‘the Anthropocene’, strongly undermines appreciation that the
ssues lie more in diverse and dynamic possibilities for alternative
ifferent societies and economies, rather than in degrees of techni-
al compliance with supposedly ﬁxed environmental boundaries
279,280]. That the Anthropocene is also deﬁned in terms of
domination’ [281–283] of the Earth by this supposedly seamless
humanity’ [284], reinforces discourses of control and compounds
heir de-politicisation. With latitude for political debate – let alone
emocratic accountability – thus even more seriously eroded, this
tarkly imperative discourse fuels the desperate fallacies of control
iscussed above around climate geoengineering. Where ‘Sustaina-
ility’ is addressed like this as a determinate technical end, rather
han as an empowering democratic process for determining plu-
al human and ecological ends, then it betrays its own foundations
268,285].
. Social science implications
The key challenges presented by these developments for social
cience seem clear. These lie in moves away from deﬁning Sustaina-
ility in general – and Sustainable energy in particular – exclusively
n terms of outcomes. Social research is as much about the pro-
esses and directions of change through which understandings and
evelopments do or don’t unfold, as about any goals and end-points
n themselves. Crucial here is a key neglected theme in Brundtland’s
riginal characterisation of Sustainability – emphasising needs for
effective citizen participation” (259:16;58) and “greater democ-
acy” (259:16). This was emphasised not just as a means to decide
etailed modes of implementation, but to resolve the meanings of
ustainability itself. If the social science of energy is to take Sus-
ainability seriously, then this is the sense in which it must be
eant. And if social research is to claim any alignment with these
oals, then democracy itself – in all its many plural, ambiguous and
ncertain forms – is not only a central analytical focus but a pivotal
ormative commitment.
And it arises from the preceding argument, that diverse aspects
f democracy are as important in the constituting of robust knowl-
dge, as in implementing any associated actions. But this is where
 further particular problem becomes evident in social research for
nergy transformation. In ways such as those exempliﬁed above,
oo much contemporary social science in this area invokes ‘Sus-
ainability’ as if the meaning were so obvious that it can remain
nstated. Similar non-speciﬁcity in the advancing of interests like
sustainable business’ or ‘sustainable proﬁts’, can lead to highly
nstrumental manipulation [286]. So, in the rush to effect a sup-
osedly singular self-evident ‘Sustainability transition’, it often
emains under-explored exactly what ‘sustainable energy’ might
ctually mean. And this is especially true of the plural social pro-
esses through which the disparate meanings and enactments of
sustainable energy’ will be diversely experimented and under-
tood.
Of course – whether deliberately or not – much public engage-
ent activity in the energy ﬁeld highlights exactly these issues
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287–289]. But it remains the case that this is often quite inciden-
al. Rather than seeking explicitly, systematically and as a priority,
o advance wider critical politics and democracy, much social
esearch for policy analysis in this ﬁeld, restricts experimentation
n ‘public engagement’ to the securing of instrumental forms of clo-
ure. Yet more prominent than democratisation in many of these
nitiatives – especially in funding bids – are incumbent imperatives
o: justify decisions [28]; command authority [290]; foster trust
291]; build legitimacy [292]; manage blame [293]; secure accep-
ance [294]; or even administer “sedation” [295]. So, it is here that a
nal normative implication for social science becomes most clear:
o help enable the more vigorous, equitable and inclusively crit-
cal democracy envisaged (for instance) by Brundtland. And this
s as important with respect to the meanings of ‘Sustainability’
tself, as to understandings of the most appropriate practices and
nnovations through which to achieve it in the energy domain.
It is in these politics of knowledge, that social science in the
nergy ﬁeld – as elsewhere – encounters one of its own  deepest,
ost intractable and distinctive features: the “double hermeneu-
ic” [296]. Knowledge in general is socially produced. And this
ncludes knowledge about society and its energy possibilities. So,
lone among the natural scientiﬁc and engineering disciplines
hich otherwise dominate the ﬁeld of energy and Sustainability
esearch, social science is distinguished by the fact that subjective
onditions of enquiry are not only directed at objects of interest, but
lso form part of that object. And what this means in turn, is that
 without deliberate counterbalancing efforts – the social orders
hat typically impact most strongly on the production of knowl-
dge, can end up as those that are already incumbent within this
etting [57].
Recognising this, is often uncomfortable. It can be especially
nderappreciated in interdisciplinary initiatives, where their lack
f ‘double hermeneutic’ dilemmas mean that natural sciences and
ngineering are typically able much more readily (though no less
puriously) to pretend at objective detachment. And where social
cience attempts to acknowledge this discomfort, the problems are
urther compounded. Efforts at ‘opening up’ the implications of
lternative values and interests are often rejected as impossibly
nexpedient to decision making. Ironically, this can lead positions
hat are otherwise most apparently positive about ‘natural reali-
ies’, also to be those most prone to subordinating these ‘real world’
omplexities and indeterminacies to politically driven simpliﬁca-
ion and closure [256]. Even more ironically, it is rare occasions
here social science attempts to escape this politically driven bias
nd closure, that it tends to be most criticised as inappropriately
artisan. Like iron ﬁlings in magnetic ﬁelds, the contours of neutral-
ty in a world without objectivity, are taken to align with whatever
re the most powerful proximate interests.
Instead of challenging this, and explaining the obvious salience
f the double hermeneutic, much social science in the energy ﬁeld
eems to prefer to try to don the same objectivist body language
s the other disciplines with which it is engaged. Economics, social
sychology, political science and sociology alike all often tend to
gnore the resulting conditioning effects of particular institutional
r disciplinary normativities on their own associated understand-
ngs. The resulting knowledges are treated as if objectively synoptic
297]. So, if there is an aspiration to greater consistency and rigour
han this, then tacit denial of normativity must be replaced with
xplicit declaration. Only in this way, may  interpretive qualitative
nderstandings achieve the qualities of plurality and conditionality
ighlighted above as also desirable for quantitative analysis. With-
ut these qualities, social science may  itself be judged as further
omplicit in the wider processes of attenuation of democracy.
This means that a balanced role for any social science that
eeks to be aligned more generally with progressive (for instance,
i
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rundtland-style) visions for democracy, lies not merely in
opening up’ understandings of the implications of otherwise-
arginalised perspectives [298]. The aim must also be much more
eliberately and directly to critically resist the forces of closure
299]. That such a balanced and reasoned aspiration in academia
hould so often be caricatured as inappropriately normative, is
tself an indication of the salience of democratic aims. Rather than
retending that power relations have no bearing on knowledge
roduction, this explicitly and actively democratic approach simply
eans being more rigorous about this indisputable social fact.
The essence of a democratic social science in energy stud-
es, then (like democracy in general), lies in constant struggle, of
ultiple kinds, to counter these kinds of dynamic. Romanticised
otions of transcendent neutrality are manifestly ﬁctive. Even as
ims, they are (through tacit denial of the double hermeneutic in
ocial understandings), potentially corrosive of democracy. So, the
oint is not one of striving fully or ﬁnally to eradicate what social
esearch repeatedly teaches may  in many ways be intrinsic (or
navoidably circumstantial or emergent) asymmetries of agency.
nd the message need not even be that a particular concentration
f power is somehow inherently bad. The issue instead, is that all
he many forms of power – and their associated kinds of closure
 may  conﬁdently be expected to take care of themselves. So, any
roadly democratic purpose in social research (as outside), lies not
n some particular notional outcome, but in a never-ending and
ver-provisional struggle to reduce these asymmetries of agency
s much as may  reasonably be achieved in any given context.
. Reﬂexive transformation
Whether they are agreed with or not, the considerations raised
n this paper relate not only to social research around energy sys-
ems, but to social science in general. In this, the points made
ere seek to substantiate the argument with which this paper
egan, that the momentous current circumstances bearing on
lobal energy choices are not only crucial in their own right, but
lso offer a potentially formative locus for addressing issues and
orces of much wider political importance. And these relate as
uch to the conﬁguring of formative knowledges about society,
s to the material constituting of society itself. So, for any kind of
emocratic sensibility, a key problem lies in the powerful general
ressures (documented here speciﬁcally in relation to energy tran-
itions), that can act to suppress serious discussion of these wider
nd deeper issues and forces. Drawing on deeper themes in politics
nd social science, then, the paper will end with a series of speciﬁc
ormative principles. These will be intended as heuristics, if not to
uide, then at least to help catalyse and provoke more active and
xplicit attention.
It will not escape the reader’s attention, however, that to make
uch attempts here at concrete prescription, seems to incur its
wn contradictions. What of the earlier call for reﬂexivity? Does
his not compel never-endingly recursive qualiﬁcation, in contin-
al regress away from clear positive implications for action? The
hort answer is ‘no’. The analysis above pointed not to the suppres-
ion of normativity, but to the need for more explicit declaration –
ven celebration. Criticising scientistic claims to singular deﬁnitive
bjectivity, does not mean rejecting the taking of positions. Instead,
t was argued that reﬂexivity brings a responsibility to represent
nowledge and its implications in ‘plural and conditional’ ways.
nd – in recognising how knowledge is shaped by power – reﬂex-
vity also challenges the conventional sequencing of knowledge as
rior to action. Interventions by social research concerning energy
ransformation, are (whether acknowledged or not) about political
ction as much as about academic understanding.
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In this sense, prescriptive recommendations such as those
ade here are entirely reasonable in social science. But they are
nly reﬂexive in the democratic senses outlined above, when
hey openly explore their own underlying formative epistemic
nd normative conditions. In the present article, then, these
riving motivations have been explained to lie in a relational
nderstanding that substantive transformations in any given area
ike energy, are possible only through the transforming of power
tself. It has been argued that this entails in turn a commitment
o continual democratic struggle against the effects of concen-
rated power – in knowledge as much as in more material social
tructures.
So, this form of reﬂexivity is not some transcendent ‘vertical’
virtue”, locatable in individual social actors [300]. As elaborated
lsewhere [301], it lies arguably instead in many horizontally
istributed social ﬁelds of turbulent relational ﬂows. In short,
eﬂexivity is as much about action as knowledge. And, in this
iew, the social science of energy is – like other research –
 particular kind of social action. So, associated normative and
pistemic commitments (implicit or explicit) are not antithetical
o reﬂexivity, but – in appropriately democratic wider con-
exts – provide the formative (though ever-provisional) fulcra for
atalysing the counter reactions. Indeed, it is this distributed, unco-
rdinated, agonistic but mutually co-constituting cycle between
ommitment and reaction that arguably best characterises social
eﬂexivity.
The role for aspiringly transformative social research on energy,
hen, lies not in seeking to court the patronage of proximate
ower, by “seeing like a state” [38]. The analogy is perhaps more
ith the dynamics of social movements. Here, the “strategic essen-
ialism” of campaigning organisations provides “the simpliﬁed
olitical representations that social movements must generate
o cohere” (302:5052,303). These may  sometimes amount to lit-
le more than ‘civilising hypocrisies’ [304]. But the associated
nterplay of many kinds of knowledges, values and interests
emains explicitly situated in social action. It is arguably only
hrough this kind of dynamic, rather than the orderly structures
f ‘evidence based policy’, that diverse societies worldwide, may
ruly hope to help catalyse the kinds of collective reﬂexivity
ecessary for substantive (rather than rhetorical) global energy
ransformations.
Returning at the end, then, to the themes around power with
hich this paper began, substantive (rather than superﬁcial) trans-
ormation is not – for reasons given there – achievable through
control’. The subverting dynamics of power discussed through-
ut this paper, simply accentuate this. And the implications are
specially important for social constituencies that are as typically
arginal to incumbent concentrations of power, as is the case of
ost energy transitions researchers. For these, the above picture of
he progressive potential of social reﬂexivity, suggests instead that
ubstantive transformation is better achieved through care, rather
han control [305]. And what speciﬁcally needs to be cared for, are
ider democratic capacities for scepticism, openness, participa-
ion, accountability and critical dissent [237] – such as to allow the
ecessary transformative reﬂexivity to thrive.
Where action is acknowledged to shape knowledge, but
nowledge to constitute action, social science interventions are
ccountable in both ways – as hybrid ‘knowing doings’ [306]. And
f the aim is substantive (rather than superﬁcial) transformation,
hen they should not seek to imitate the synoptic pretensions and
ctive aspirations of incumbency to control. They are best enacted
nstead in more modestly subaltern ways, as ‘Trojan horses’ and
political judo’ [15] of kinds whose effects lie not in their own
irect purported force, but in the wider reﬂexive reactions. This is
ike the ﬂocking behaviour of animals, or the dynamics of cultureial Science 1 (2014) 83–95 91
ore generally – an arena for some of the most radical, rapid and
ransformative forms of social change. So it is arguably through
eﬂexively democratic ‘culturing’ of transformative change [307],
ather than by more ‘managing’ forms of governance, that gen-
inely substantive energy transformations face their greatest
rospects for hope.
. Knowing doing transformation
It is in this heuristic, reﬂexive and aspiringly catalytic spirit of
istributed ‘knowing doing’, then, that this paper is offered. The fol-
owing recommendations are voiced not as transcendent ‘evidence’
rom supposedly apolitical ‘integrated’ analysis. Instead, they are
uch more provisional, situated reactions to the particular polit-
cal dynamics in which they are embedded. Whether as ‘trojan
orses’, ‘political judo’ or ‘civilising hypocrisies’, then, there emerge
 series of concrete implications for the ‘culturing’ of energy trans-
ormation. Though much latitude remains for interpretation, each
rinciple is conditional on the explicitly normative position arti-
ulated earlier – in favour of emancipatory democracy as the only
enuine means to achieve progressive social transformation [308].
f social science is to support transformations of this kind in Sus-
ainable global energy infrastructures, these principles may  prove
orrespondingly important.
The roles of social science in interdisciplinary energy research, are
not just about the social complexities encountered in pursuing
goals driven primarily by natural science or engineering. Social
research also assists in framing priorities, questions and options
for these other disciplines – in turn informing its own driving
aims and those of society more widely.
Aspirations (still more, claims) to singular uniquely prescriptive
‘sound scientiﬁc’ or ‘evidence based’ ﬁndings are as misleading
in the social science of energy as in other ﬁelds. This is as true of
interpretive appreciation and participatory deliberation as it is of
quantitative analysis. A responsibility not to mislead, confers an
obligation not just to avoid, but also to deconstruct these forms
of justiﬁcatory closure.
So, social science should therefore not only refrain from, but
actively critique, policy recommendations presented in singular
prescriptive ways. Instead, it should convey to policy making and
wider political debates an explicit and symmetrical plurality of
social interpretations of energy alternatives, each equally valid
under different reasonable perspectives – carefully explicating
with each, its associated constituting conditions.
And in these interests of more balanced understanding, energy
social science should also interrogate the processes for clo-
sure in which it is itself located, which enforce the practices
of justiﬁcation. This includes challenging how speciﬁc reduced
understandings arise of ‘Sustainability’, ‘transitions’ and ‘plane-
tary governance’ – and showing how these favour and suppress
particular political interests and implications.
This in turn entails that social science in service of democratic
energy politics should be open and reﬂexively self-critical about
its own  subjectivities – whether these be shaped by theoreti-
cal frameworks, methodological styles, disciplinary interests or
expert community values. It is a matter of rigour, then, that social
science should in this way help ‘open up’ (rather than ‘close
down’) the space for robust wider policy debate.
Where values are openly declared, broadly democratic (rather
than merely disciplinary) aims in energy social science research,
must seek not only to reverse tendencies to closure, but strongly
to resist the shaping of knowledge by incumbent interests. It is
thus a matter of rigour as much as democracy, actively to help
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rebalance marginal interests, redistribute privilege and enable
choices beneﬁtting the less powerful.
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